The Crime We Forget? White-Collar Crime: Problems in Defining Motive and Enforcement of Followers

Crime permeates the United States. In 2024 alone, 14 million criminal offenses were reported.¹ When asked to think of crime, many are generally inclined to associate crime with violent crimes—like murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.² However, society seems to forget about another dangerous form of crime: white-collar crime.

This article focuses on what motivates followers to commit white-collar crime and, based on these motivations, recommends solutions for better preventing them from committing these crimes.

What is White-Collar Crime?

What is white-collar crime? Like many aspects of the crime itself, arriving at a singular definition is difficult. There is currently no generally accepted scholarly definition.³ However, many scholars look to the work of Edwin H. Sutherland, the “Godfather of white-collar crime,” who defined white-collar crime as “a crime committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation.”⁴      

Today, the FBI refers to white-collar crime as “synonymous with the wide range of frauds committed by business and government professionals.”⁵ It consists of “nonviolent crimes usually committed in commercial situations for financial gain.”⁶ Further offenses grouped into white-collar crime include: “fraud, corruption, embezzlement, misappropriation and malfeasance, tax fraud, intellectual property theft, insider trading, money laundering, Ponzi schemes, misrepresentation of financial statements, price-fixing, illegal cartels, collusion, and environmental health and safety regulations.”⁷

 What Motivates White-Collar Crime?

Motives and intents of white-collar criminals are assumed to be substantially different from motives and intents embedded in traditional criminal law.⁸ Motives and intents of white-collar criminals are different because of the “tendency among the general public, psychologists, and criminologists to see the traditional criminal as an abnormal individual with significant biological and psychological differences than ordinary members of society.”⁹ Further, while traditional criminal statutes typically involve an element of or discussion regarding the intent of the criminal, Edwin Sutherland believed the traditional mens rea (intent) requirement and presumption of innocence should be disregarded for white-collar criminals.¹⁰

Instead of intent, Sutherland focuses more on the status of the white-collar criminal to emphasize the distinction of white-collar crime.¹¹ Sutherland’s justification for focusing on status instead of intent of the white-collar criminal adds focus to the higher social position of perpetrators that is absent in traditional crimes.¹² Therefore, instead of focusing on intent, it is best to look at other motivations of white-collar criminals.    

In order to understand what motivates white-collar criminals, we first must understand the two “buckets” these criminals fall into: leaders and followers.¹³ Classifying white-collar criminals into leaders or followers follows the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”), which distinguish those who lead the crime and those who abet it.¹⁴ For the purposes of this article, I will focus on the motivations of followers, but to understand who a follower is, we must understand their distinction from leaders.           

          1. Leaders         

Section 3B1.1 of the Guidelines recognizes leadership as an “aggravating factor” by subjecting leaders to various sentencing enhancements.¹⁵ One’s title within a criminal enterprise does not automatically give rise to being treated as a leader. Instead, courts are to consider whether one is a leader based on    

the exercise of decision-making authority, the nature of participation in the commission of the offense, the recruitment of accomplices, the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the crime, the degree of participation in planning or organizing the offense, the nature and scope of illegal activity, and the degree of control and authority exercised over others in the scope of the crime.¹⁶

Leaders have various motives for engaging in white-collar crime, and while greed is the most commonly cited motive, financial gain and money are also cited as leading motives for committing white-collar crimes.¹⁷ Leaders are also motivated by other behavioral factors, such as “a sense of entitlement, arrogance, competitiveness, and rationalization.”¹⁸ And while a leader’s motive is commonly linked to behavioral factors, leaders are also motivated by factors directly related to their job or lifestyle, such as fear of failure at work or fear of losing their lifestyle.¹⁹

         2. Followers

Followers have different motivations because they are often following what leaders ask of them, making followers less culpable than their counterparts.²⁰ Further, there is less consensus in the motivations of followers—leading to a wider range of theories of why they commit white-collar crimes.²¹ Some theories focus on the personality of followers—claiming they are “weak,” and thus trail behind others into criminal schemes—while other theories focus on followers’ commitment to their job—where followers believe that their work is part of the “rightness of their cause” or that, by following the leader, they may either receive a pay raise or promotion.²² However, followers’ motivation may overlap with leaders, as they notably share emotions like fear. However, the basis of followers’ fear is different, as their fear typically stems from fear of losing their job, and/or physical harm.²³

What Motivates Followers?

          1. Corporate Culture

Corporate culture may motivate a follower to become a white-collar criminal. White-collar crime is argued to be a learned behavior, and the theory of “deferential association”—that whether one commits a crime depends on “frequency and intensity of associations with other criminals”—supports the data that a company’s culture may influence one’s decision to engage in white-collar crime.²⁴ This is further supported by a consensus among scholars who believe that the structure of an organization, the pressures placed upon management, and the level of ethics a corporation employs play an important role in whether or not their employees will engage in white-collar crime.²⁵

Scholars like Pamela Bucy have identified four common practices and policies by organizations believed to encourage white-collar crimes and are applicable to followers. These include: (1) Being too driven by a bottom line, which shifts the overriding focus of the organization to meeting numbers and maximizing profits; (2) having an inadequate corporate compliance plan; (3) having a lack of internal controls, including a weak and dependent board of directors, lack of auditors, lack of checks and balances throughout the company, and a decentralized management structure, and; (4) an overall corporate culture where management “sends” a message that questionable behavior is tolerated.²⁶ These aspects of corporate culture may play a role in followers’ calculus to engage in white-collar crime.

          2. Culture of Money as the King

Unquestionably, we live in a society where money, materials, and objects are viewed as the “King.” The idea of wealth and success being the central goals of life as we know it are traced to the “culture of competition.”²⁷ In the “culture of competition,” each person is seen as largely responsible for their financial condition––being successful is seen as an intrinsic worth, and the competitive struggle for personal gain is viewed as a positive, as competition produces a maximum economic value for society as a whole.²⁸ Further, the pursuit of economic interest and one’s effort to surpass their peers in the accumulation of wealth and status are critically important in today’s society.²⁹ Thus, the culture of competition creates an environment where the poor are stigmatized as deserving of their position due to their laziness, while the wealthy are “winners,” admired for their ability and drive to be successful.³⁰ Accordingly, the desire for wealth and success due to the culture of competition may motivate followers—typically lower on the corporate hierarchy—to engage in white-collar crime.³¹

          3. Irrational Beliefs of “No One is Being Harmed” and “Laws Being Violated are Unnecessary and Unjust”

Two fallacies that may influence followers to engage in white-collar crime are a belief that no one is being harmed and that the laws being violated are unnecessary and unjust. Neutralization techniques including a denial of injury—meaning a criminal engaged in the crime because they believe their act did not produce any injury—and denying the victim—meaning the criminal believes that no, singular person was harmed by their act––contribute to the belief that no one is being harmed.³² Due to the non-violent nature of white-collar crimes, followers may insulate themselves through these neutralization techniques to justify their crimes.

A belief the laws being violated are unnecessary and unjust is closely related to the theory of laissez-faire capitalism, and that government interference in the free market is wrongful.³³ According to James Coleman, laissez-faire capitalists believe many regulatory laws are more harmful to the public than the practices they prohibit; therefore, white-collar criminals may justify their crimes by appeals to laissez-faire capitalism.³⁴ And closely related is the rationalization that certain crimes are necessary to achieve vital economic goals, or to just survive, as seen in contexts including politics and regular business.³⁵ Under this justification, white-collar criminals commit crimes because of the unjust consequences they believe would otherwise occur—including but not limited to loss of their own, or others jobs.³⁶

Solutions to Prevent Followers from Engaging in White-Collar Crime

To prevent followers from engaging in white-collar crimes, changes must occur to both internal and external structures which regulate the crime. Internally, organizations should develop better compliance systems that allow employees to report wrongdoing within the organization, while externally, criminal charges should more often be sought to deter followers from engaging in these crimes.

          1. Internal Enforcement Mechanisms

Compliance management systems help organizations better understand what happens throughout their organization, as these systems identify misconduct before it proliferates throughout the organization. They are effective in not only preventing criminal behavior but also deterring day-to-day unethical behavior.³⁷ Thus, compliance systems can be useful in establishing and maintaining a corporate culture that discourages wrongdoing.      

In turn, creating a corporate culture that oversees and discourages wrongdoing can mitigate followers’ motivation to commit white-collar crimes. Increased regulation from inside an organization would likely prevent the proliferation of white-collar crimes. Fortunately, companies in the US are incentivized by the law to self-regulate, as the law treats companies with effective compliance and ethics programs more leniently than companies without effective compliance and ethics programs.³⁸

Effective compliance programs may involve “an anonymous hotline for reporting suspicious behavior, routine training for employees, proper oversight, and swift punishment for those involved in detected crimes.”³⁹ Aside from an effective compliance program, other characteristics that discourage criminal activity include a corporate mission beyond a bottom line, having strong internal controls—such as a strong, independent board, internal and external auditors, appropriate checks and balances, and recentralized management structure—and in general, being an organization that discourages criminal activity. Discouraging criminal activity nevertheless begins at the top with a strong, ethical management structure—as commitment to compliance at upper management permeates in ensuring law-abiding behavior throughout all levels of an organization.

          2. External Enforcement Mechanisms

Externally, the SEC and DOJ together should shift their focus from prosecuting white-collar crimes against organizations to prosecuting the individuals who commit the crimes themselves.⁴⁰ Coinciding with shifting the focus of prosecution from organizations to individuals, the SEC should recommend more violations to the DOJ for criminal prosecution. In turn, the DOJ must become “tougher” in their criminal prosecution of white-collar crimes, as the DOJ should more often seek jail or imprisonment for criminals, instead of settlements that involve large fines and a lack of jail time.

Admittedly, the structure and current practices of the SEC have their upsides. For example, there is  a lower burden of proof to hold wrongdoers accountable if jail time isn’t sought. Nevertheless, it has its shortcomings in its inability to hold wrongdoers accountable in our criminal justice system. The fact that over 90% of suspects investigated by the SEC could be charged with violating a criminal provision, but less than 10% are indicted, and less than 5% end up serving jail time does not provide justice for all. For example, imagine if prosecutors, when dealing with cases of regular theft, had probable cause to charge over 90% of every 100 perpetrators, but only recommended 11 for criminal proceedings, and less than 10% were actually indicted. There would likely be widespread public outrage, accompanied by calls for criminal justice reform. Why not apply this same sense of justice to white collar crime?

Conclusion

White-collar crime permeates the United States, but due to its non-violent nature, it seems we may often “forget” about this crime. To prevent followers from engaging in white-collar crimes, corporations should implement better oversight mechanisms, including strong compliance systems, and a strong corporate governance that promotes a culture committed to combatting wrongdoing. Further, the SEC and DOJ must change their current attitudes and overall approach by criminally punishing followers who commit the crimes themselves, instead of punishing corporations, and preferring civil adjudication of offenses. This will not only deter followers from engaging in white-collar crime, but in turn will bring us closer to a safer, fairer society.

John Stillman is a J.D. Candidate at Notre Dame Law School, and member of the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy. He holds both a B.S. in Political Science, and MBA from Bradley University.

1. FBI Releases 2024 Reported Crimes in the Nation Statistics, FBI (Aug. 5, 2025), https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/fbi-releases-2024-reported-crimes-in-the-nation-statistics. ↩︎
2. FBI, Violent Crime, 2015 Crime in the United States, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2015/crime-in-the-u.s.-2015/offenses-known-to-law-enforcement/violent-crime#:~:text=Definition,force%20or%20threat%20of%20force (last visited Dec. 14, 2025).Hartmut Berghoff & Uwe Spiekermann, Shady Business: On the History of White-Collar Crime, 60 Bus. His. 289, 289 (2018). ↩︎
3. Hartmut Berghoff & Uwe Spiekermann, Shady Business: On the History of White-Collar Crime, 60 Bus. His. 289, 289 (2018). ↩︎
4. Gilbert Geis, White Collar Crime: What Is It?, 3 Current Issues in Crim. Just. 9, 12 (1991). Sutherland arrived at this definition of white-collar crime in his monograph White-collar Crime. Id. at 11. ↩︎
5. What is White-Collar Crime, and How is the FBI Combating It?, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/about/faqs/what-is-white-collar-crime-and-how-is-the-fbi-combating-it (last visited Dec. 14, 2025); White-Collar Crime, Legal Information Institute, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/white-collar_crime (last visited Dec. 14, 2025) ↩︎
6. Id.  ↩︎
7. Berghoff & Spiekermann, supra note 3, at 289–90. ↩︎
8. John Baker, The Sociological Origins of “White-Collar Crime, The Heritage Found. (Oct. 4, 2004), https://www.heritage.org/report/the-sociological-origins-white-collar-crime. ↩︎
9. James William Coleman, Toward an Integrated Theory of White-Collar Crime, 93 Am. J. of Sociology 406, 409 (1987). ↩︎
10. Baker, supra note 8.  ↩︎
11. Id. ↩︎
12. Id. ↩︎
13. Pamela H. Bucy et al., Why Do They Do It: The Motives, Mores, and Character of White Collar Criminals, 82 St. John’s L. Rev. 401, 405 (2008). ↩︎
14. Id. “The Federal Sentencing Guidelines provide stiffer sentences for those who actually commit a crime versus those who aid and abet . . . [and those] who participate as co-conspirators. ↩︎
15. U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 3B1.1. ↩︎
16. Id. at § 3B1.1.cmt. n.4. ↩︎
17. Bucy et al., supra note 13, at 406. The study in this article is based on a survey of forty-five nationally recognized experts in the area of white-collar crime. Id. at 401–03. ↩︎
18. Id. at 407. ↩︎
19. Id. ↩︎
20. Id. at 409–11. ↩︎
21. Id. at 411–13. ↩︎
22. Id at 409 (citations omitted). ↩︎
23. See, e.g., id. (Contrasting from leaders’ fear of losing their lifestyle, or failing at work). ↩︎
24. Joe McGrath, Why Do Good People Do Bad Things? A Multi-Level Analysis of Individual, Organizational, and Structural Causes of White-Collar Crime, 43 Seattle Univ. L. Rev. 525, 539 (2020). ↩︎
25. Bucy et al., supra note 13, at 412. Rational choice theorists and leaders in white-collar academia alike believe in the crucial role corporate culture plays in motivating white-collar crimes. See id. at 411–12. ↩︎
26. Id. at 421–22. ↩︎
27. Coleman, supra note 9, at 416. “Culture of competition” is traced back to the seventeenth century, and the works of Hobbes, Locke, and other social thinkers. Id. ↩︎
28. Id. ↩︎
29. Id. ↩︎
30. Id. ↩︎
31. See id. at 417. The citation specifically refers the culture of competition motivating the white-collar criminal stronger in the twentieth century. I am operating under a well-reasoned assumption this has only continued in the first quarter of the twenty-first century. ↩︎
32. William Stadler & Michael L. Benson, Revisiting the Guilty Mind: The Neutralization of White-Collar Crime, 37 Crim. Just. Rev. 494, 496 (2012). ↩︎
33. Coleman, supra note 9, at 411. ↩︎
34. See id. ↩︎
35. See id. ↩︎
36. Id. See also II.B supra. ↩︎
37. Benjamin van Rooji & Adam Fine, Preventing Corporate Crime from Within: Compliance Management, Whistleblowing and Internal Monitoring, 2020 UC Irvine Sch. of L. Rsch. Paper, 6, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781118775004.ch15. ↩︎
38. Id. at 5. ↩︎
39. Petter Gottschalk, Prevention of White Collar Crime: The Role of Accounting, 3 J. Of Forensic & Investigative Acct., 23, 43 (2011), http://web.nacva.com/JFIA/Issues/JFIA-2011-1_2.pdf. ↩︎
40. In the context of prosecuting corporations, the DOJ should return to factors seen in the Yates Memorandum, which would not give a corporation any “credit” unless they fully cooperated with the DOJ’s investigation.  See Yates Memorandum, U.S. Dep’t of Just. (Sep. 9, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036/dl?inline=. ↩︎